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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
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P 301852Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7799
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 04790

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PLENARY, MARCH 30, 1978
(SALT TWO-1669)

REFS: A. SALT TWO-1671
B. SALT TWO-1670
C. STATE 074915

1. AT MARCH 30 PLENARY, SEMENOV'S STATEMENT (REFTEL A) RESTATED SOVIET POSITION AND RATIONALE FOR LEVEL AND TIMING OF AGGREGATE REDUCTIONS, SAYING REDUCTIONS BELOW 2400 SHOULD NOT BEGIN BEFORE PROTOCOL ISSUES RESOLVED (STRONGLY IMPLYING PROTOCOL EXPIRATION BY JANUARY 1, 1981). SEMENOV ALSO STATED SOVIETS COULD ACCOMMODATE REDUCTIONS TO 2400 IN 6 MONTHS, IN CONTRAST TO LONGER TIME REQUIRED FOR REDUCTIONS FROM 2400, BECAUSE BISON HEAVY BOMBER WOULD ACCOUNT FOR MAJOR PORTION OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS.

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2. WARNKE'S STATEMENT (REFTEL B) IMPLEMENTED INSTRUCTIONS RE ARTICLE II.3 (REFTEL C) AND PROPOSED TYPE RULE BASED ON FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCES (FRODS), VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED AS NECESSARY BY COOPERATIVE MEASURES, FOR DISTINGUISHING HEAVY BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS FROM OTHER AIRPLANES. BEAR RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES WERE CITED AS

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EXAMPLE OF AIRPLANES HAVING FRODS AND WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN AGGREGATE. BEAR ASW AND B-52 AIRPLANES NOT EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WERE EXCEPTED FROM FRODS TYPE RULE. BEAR ASW AIRPLANES WOULD NOT COUNT IN AGGREGATE AND ONLY B-52S EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WOULD COUNT IN 1320. WARNKE STATED BISON TANKERS WOULD COUNT UNTIL REMOVED UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES, BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF FRODS. US RIGHT TO CONVERT TRANSPORT TYPE AIRPLANES TO CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS WAS AFFIRMED. (FYI: REVISED LANGUAGE FOR CRUISE MISSILE DEFINITION WILL BE TABLED IN DRAFTING GROUP ON MARCH 31 ALONG WITH REVISED LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE II.3.)

3. IN POST-PLENARY DISCUSSION, SEMENOV REITERATED SOVIET POSITION ON TIMING OF REDUCTIONS. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, WARNKE CRITICIZED SOVIET NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY "WEAKENING" REFERENCE AND IMPLICATION THAT TRANSFERS IN AND OF THEMSELVES SHOULD BE PRECLUDED. SEMENOV SAID USSR HAD NO INTENTION TO DESTROY NATO ALLIANCE, AND WAS ALSO AWARE OF NATURE AND DIMENSION OF US COOPERATION WITH ITS ALLIES, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF US GIVING ITS ALLIES "NEW" GENERATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SEMENOV ALSO SAID SOVIET DATA BASE NUMBERS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1978 FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR ASBMS, AND ASBMS WERE ALL ZERO,
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AND SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD US HAD NO ARMS IN THESE CATEGORIES. I CONFIRMED HIS UNDERSTANDING REGARDING US SYSTEMS.

4. ROWNY/BELETSKY-STARODUBOV BILATERAL. BELETSKY COMPLAINED THAT WE WERE NOT TAKING SERIOUSLY SOVIET INSISTENCE ON REDUCTIONS ONLY AFTER PROTOCOL IS RESOLVED AND THE DIFFICULTIES SOVIETS WOULD HAVE IN MAKING FOLLOW-ON REDUCTIONS WITHIN A SIX-MONTH PERIOD. TO ROWNY'S STATEMENT THAT INCLUDING AIRCRAFT WITH LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES UNDER 1320 AGGREGATE WAS LINKED TO SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF FOLLOW-ON REDUCTIONS, BELETSKY SAID SOVIETS DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE LINKAGE AND CONSIDER THE ISSUE CLOSED. BELETSKY ASKED IF WE HAD SPECIFIC COOPERATIVE MEASURES IN MIND TO WHICH ROWNY ANSWERED, "NO."

5. JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL. SHCHUKIN, NOTING WE HAD INDICATED THEY WOULD BE USED ONLY AS NECESSARY, ASKED FOR A DEFINITION OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES--WERE THEY SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING DISCUSSED FOR CTB SUCH AS ON-SITE INSPECTION. JOHNSON REPLIED THAT WAS CONCEIVABLE, BUT EMPHASIZED CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH. WITH REGARD TO CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO

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600 KM SYSTEMS, SHCHUKIN BELIEVED THAT MAKING A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS MIGHT HELP--SUGGESTING THAT TACTICAL MISSILES WOULD BE USED ONLY AGAINST NON-FIXED TARGETS AND STRATEGIC MISSILES WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIXED TARGETS. ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION HE QUESTIONED LOGIC OF EXEMPTING NOTICE OF SINGLE LAUNCHES FROM TEST RANGES WHILE REQUIRING NOTICE OF LAUNCHES FROM OPERATIONAL SITES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7800
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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6. LTCOL JOHNSON/JOURAVLEV BILATERAL. JOURAVLEV ARGUED THAT AIRPLANES CAPABLE OF CARRYING MORE CRUISE MISSILES THAN A B-52 SHOULD COUNT FOR MORE THAN ONE UNIT IN 1320 AGGREGATE, SAYING THAT AN AIRPLANE CAPABLE OF CARRYING ONLY ONE CRUISE MISSILE SHOULD NOT COUNT IN 1320, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A "MIRV."

7. FLANNERY/PAVLICHENKO BILATERAL. PAVLICHENKO CLAIMED THAT SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO REMOVE OVER 100 SYSTEMS, PRIMARILY BISON BOMBERS, TO GET DOWN TO 2400. FURTHER REDUCTION OF 150 BELOW 2400 WILL CONSIST PRIMARILY OF ICBMS AND SLBMS. THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS TO BE COVERED BY THE REDUCTION IS 260. REASON FOR 18-MONTH REDUCTIONS PERIOD IS LACK OF SKILLED MANPOWER.

8. NEXT MEETING WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5. EARLE

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